5.12.1941 Soviet counter-offensive began

Soviet troops under Zhukov's command launch a counter-offensive on 5 December 1941, pushing the Germans back eighty kilometres and saving the capital.

While the first strike of General Adrian Grigorievich Shaposhnikov's offensive was directed north against the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, the second was to be forward against the overstretched 2nd Panzer Army. Although General Heinz Guderian had already ordered a partial withdrawal of his troops on 5 December, he was nevertheless hit by strikes from the 50th Army on 6 and 7 December. Army at Tula, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps south of Kashira, and the newly formed 10th Army, which occupied Mikhailov.

Guderian's situation deteriorated further when his weakened right flank was attacked by the 3rd and 13th Armies of Timoshenko's Southwestern Front. On 10 December the Soviet cavalry penetrated the positions of XXXIV. Army Corps, cut off units of the 45th, 95th and 134th Infantry Divisions for several days and threatened to liquidate them.

"Lieutenant General Konrad von Cochen Hausen, commander of the 134th Infantry Division, committed suicide on 13 December to avoid being taken prisoner by the Soviets. Contrary to the claims of some sources, however, all three divisions managed to break out of the encirclement but suffered considerable losses in men and equipment. Although units XXXIV. and XXXVII. Motorized Corps of Guderian's army were able to initially repel most of the massive Soviet infantry, the Soviets were able to drive several wedges into the enemy's stretched positions and widen the gaps in contact with the 2nd and 4th Army," write Robert Forczyk and Howard Gerrard in Moscow 1941.

By 12 December, both flanks of Guderian's troops were exposed, leaving nothing to do but to begin a rapid retreat in a southwesterly direction. The Soviet cavalry took advantage of the virtual collapse of the 2nd Army's defenses and threatened the approaches to the town of Orl.

The initial phase of the Soviet winter counteroffensive succeeded in driving all three German panzer groups back from Moscow, affecting five of Army Group Center's six army groups. Only the 4th Army, which had begun preparing defensive positions as early as November 1941 and was stockpiling supplies, was unaffected by the Soviet attacks.

"The Soviet winter counteroffensive was presented by propaganda as an attack by warmly dressed Siberian troops supported by hundreds of T-34 tanks. In reality, Soviet cavalry, supported by the only a small number of tank units, with their armaments mostly light tanks," says another book, Moscow 1941.

Robert Forczyk and Howard Gerrard, Moscow 1941, Peter D. Antill, Stalingrad 1941, https://warontherocks.com/